Uncertainty increased due to slowdown and concerns about sovereign risk
Uncertainty increased due to both the slowdown in the pace of recovery of the world economy, which is somewhat more pronounced than previously anticipated, 5 and concerns about an increase in sovereign risk in some countries. An interim OECD assessment shows that economic growth in the G7 economies could slow to an annualised rate of about 1.5% in the second half of 2010. 6 Some issuers had to deal with complications generated by the pressures of a rapid increase in sovereign risk, whereby "the market" suddenly perceives the debt of some sovereigns as "risky". Bond market pressures have the potential to generate self-fulfilling debt problems by triggering higher interest rates by way of demanding compensation for higher sovereign risk that, in turn, may affect the growth prospects of countries.
7

II. Evolution of budget deficits, sovereign borrowing and debt
Budget deficits peaked at around 7.5% of GDP in 2010
Net borrowing is estimated to fall to USD 2.9 tn in 2011
The budget deficit for the OECD area as a whole is estimated to have peaked at around 7.5% of GDP in 2010 (the equivalent of approximately USD 3.3 trillion), with a projected decrease to nearly 6.5% of GDP in 2011 (the equivalent of around USD 3.0 trillion) -see Figure 1 and Table 1 . However, in spite of these (projected) improvements, deficits are still standing at near historical record levels. 8 In the wake of these developments, net borrowing requirements are estimated to fall from nearly USD 3 trillion in 2010 to around USD 2.9 trillion in 2011 (Figure 1) , a decrease from an estimated 6.7% of GDP in 2010 to little more than 6.2% in 2011 ( Table 1) .
Government debt ratios are expected to increase further
Government liabilities are being driven largely by the recessionary impact of the unprecedented 2007-2008 global liquidity and credit crisis, including government expenditures due to fiscal stimulus programmes but also the influence of recession-induced negative growth dynamics. Because of this, and despite falling interest rates during 2008-2010, the ratio of government debtto-gross domestic product is expected to continue to increase.
Central government debt is expected to reach 72% of GDP in 2011 and general government debt nearly 100%
For the OECD area as a whole, the outstanding central government debt is expected to increase from USD 30.4 trillion (the equivalent of EUR 20.1 trillion, or 67.8% of GDP) in 2010, to around USD 33.4 trillion at the end of 2011 in OECD countries (EUR 22.2 trillion or 71.7% of GDP). General government debt-to-GDP is projected to reach nearly 100% in 2011 (Figure 1 and Table 1 ). The average longterm interest rate is expected to rise to 5.1% in 2011
Of great importance for government funding operations and the projection of future borrowing needs, is the anticipated change in the direction of longer-term interest rates (Figure 2) . After the peak of the financial crisis in 2008, long rates dropped. The average long-term interest rate is expected to rise to around 5.1% in 2011, up from 3.7% in 2009. The projections assume that when government indebtedness passes a threshold of 75% of GDP, longterm interest rates increase by 4 basis points for every additional percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio 9 .
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Note: Interest payments as a percentage of total government outlays.
Source: See Annex.
III. Summary overview of the borrowing outlook for OECD country groupings
All OECD country groupings show a deterioration in government balances
Performance of "Emerging OECD" is relatively good
The unprecedented global liquidity and credit crisis was at first associated with dysfunctional and collapsing financial institutions. This then set the stage for the second phase: the surge in government deficits and government (contingent) liabilities, driven largely by the strong recessionary impact of the global financial crisis. In all OECD country groupings considered here, government balances deteriorated. For the OECD as a whole (Figure 1 and Table 1 ) and the various groupings (Figure 3a) , deficits peaked in 2009-2010. Furthermore, it can be seen that Other OECD included countries with a fiscal surplus in the period 2006 -2008 . Since 2009 , the government balance of this group of countries also turned into a deficit. In comparison with total OECD, G7 and the OECD countries of the eurozone, the performance of Emerging OECD was (and is) relatively good. 
Gross borrowing ratios of the G7 are projected to continue to increase in 2011
The mirror image of the development of budget deficits is the rapid increase in net and gross borrowing requirements. 
IV. The challenge of raising large volumes of new funds with acceptable roll-over risk
Rising debt and deficits increased the challenges faced by sovereign issuers, compounded by concerns about sovereign risk
For countries facing historically high spreads, issuance conditions were quite challenging this year. More generally, the backdrop of increasing debt levels and deficits added significantly to the difficulties faced by some countries in raising fresh funds. As noted, these difficulties were sometimes compounded by rapid increases in sovereign risk, whereby "the market" suddenly perceives the debt of some sovereigns as "risky". Financial markets are at times seen as reacting in a non-linear fashion to delayed or postponed fiscal adjustments, thereby creating the risk of cliff effects where markets suddenly lose confidence in yesterday's safe sovereign asset. Clearly, this is a major complicating factor for sovereign issuers as bond market pressures have the potential to trigger higher funding costs by demanding compensation for higher sovereign risks.
Raising large volumes of funds at lowest cost with acceptable roll-over risk remains a challenge
Recent financial market events have highlighted the importance of managing debt maturities and debt rollover risk. The results of a recent OECD questionnaire on debt portfolio management also confirmed that the financial crisis did render the funding task of most debt managers more difficult. 10 Overall, about a third of countries indicated that the crisis impact on funding activities did affect their ability to achieve their various risk metric targets.
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In general, raising large volumes of funds at the lowest cost with acceptable roll-over risk remains a great challenge for several countries.
Primary markets have continued to function reasonably well
However, primary markets for government paper (largely auctions) continued to function reasonably well in most countries. The OECD questionnaire on debt portfolio management revealed that quite a few countries mentioned that they did not have to introduce new techniques or instruments since their strategies were flexible enough to absorb the shocks. Other debt managers indicated that changes to their auction types, increased frequency of auctions, and the introduction of new bond types (e.g. inflation-linked bonds) were required.
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Risk-averse investors forced debt managers to modify their fund-raising strategies Table 2 provides an overview of the major changes made in issuance procedures and/or the conditions for using existing systems and techniques, in order to respond to liquidity pressures, rising borrowing requirements and tougher issuance conditions. The risk-averse behaviour of investors forced debt managers to modify their fund raising strategies. Ireland Syndication has been added as funding tool. Auctions also in use for short-term debt.
Italy More flexible procedures. The range of offered amounts for on-the-run bonds increased. Possibility to offer additional off-the-run bonds as response to highly volatile market conditions. Adjustment of auction pricing mechanism for nominal bonds, linkers and floaters (issuer sets discretionally the total allocated volume within the previously announced range). In BOT auctions participants are required to send their bids in terms of yield. Modification of method for calculating share in auctions. The range of the maturity of bonds sold to PDs at non-competitive prices is also extended. Introduction of reopenings of old bonds.
Korea
Since September 2009, a single-price format for auctions has been changed to a multiple price format. Introduction of conversion offers.
Mexico
Tap issues of both short-and long-term bonds.
Netherlands Increased frequency of bond auctions (of off-the-run bonds). Extended repo -and commercial paper facilities (longer maturity, extra foreign currency issuance). Extended T-bill programmes.
New Zealand
Introduction of new long-term bond. Tap issues for short-term debt. Monitoring foreign markets for finding attractive foreign-borrowing opportunities. Introduction of a new facility of "reverse tap tender". More frequent auctions, with auction schedules being more flexible and opportunistic Transparency and predictability remain key for minimising borrowing costs Table 2 shows that many DMOs are operating more frequent auctions, with auction schedules having become more flexible and opportunistic. The maturity of debt became shorter in 2008 and 2009 (Figure 6) , while there is a growing use of foreign-currency liabilities ( Table 3) . These changes, while understandable, create some risks. As debt managers become more opportunistic, issuance programmes are becoming less predictable. That may not be desirable in the long term. DMOs emphasise, therefore, that they will continue to operate a transparent debt-management framework supported by a strong communication policy. Transparency and predictability remain instrumental in reducing the type of market noise that can unnecessarily increase borrowing costs.
Norway
Debt managers rebalance towards long-term instruments
Share of short-term issuance expected to drop to around 68% in 2011
Almost all OECD debt managers continue to rebalance the profile of their debt portfolios by issuing more long-term instruments and moderating bill issuance. For the OECD area as whole, the share of short-term issuance to total gross issuance peaked at 71% during the height of the financial crisis in 2008 (Figure 4) . The following two years, the share of short-term instruments dropped back to the same share as in 2007, i.e. around 65%, while for 2011 a small increase to nearly 68% is projected. Issuance of longterm instruments dominated by fixed rate, local currency bonds but with a slight decrease in 2010-2011 Table 3 reflects the funding structure in terms of types of instruments and maturity.
14 Issuance of long-term instruments is dominated by fixed rate, local currency bonds. Of interest also is that, in 2009 (that is in the wake of the 2008 peak of the financial crisis) somewhat more foreign currency debt was issued, while the issuance of variable rate and indexed-linked instruments declined. It is estimated very tentatively that the issuance of long-term, fixed-rate instruments will slightly decrease in 2010-11, while the use of indexed-linked may increase (perhaps returning to pre-crisis levels). 
V. Central government debt and debt-service profile
Further increases in central government debt ratios are expected in 2011
In 2011, the G7 debt ratio is expected to reach 82% and 67% for the eurozone "Emerging OECD" debt ratios are below those of the G7 and the eurozone
As noted, government debt is being driven largely by the recessionary impact of the global liquidity and credit crisis. Ratios of government debt-togross domestic product are expected to increase further in 2011. Figure 5 shows that the ratios of central government debt-to-gross domestic product of all country groupings considered here have increased since 2007. The G7 central government debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to reach nearly 82% in 2011. By comparison, the debt ratio of total OECD is expected to reach nearly 72% in 2011 ( Table 1) . For eurozone countries, this ratio is estimated to be slightly less than 67%. For Other OECD (includes a number of OECD countries with a fiscal surplus), this ratio is expected to reach nearly 24% in 2011, while for Emerging OECD this is expected to be around 37%. It is of interest to observe that Emerging OECD has far lower central government debt ratios than both the G7 and the OECD countries of the eurozone. • General Government Financial Balance volumes for total OECD and country groupings are aggregated using information from the OECD Economic Outlook 87 Database, June 2010.
• Gross borrowing requirements (GBR), net borrowing requirements (NBR), central government marketable debt and debt-service profile are compiled from the answers to the Borrowing Survey. The Secretariat inserted its own estimates/projections in cases of missing information for 2010 and/or 2011, using publicly available official information on redemptions and central government budget balances.
• To facilitate comparisons with previous Outlooks, figures are converted into US dollars using exchange rates from December 1, 2009. Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream.
• Long-term interest rates are averages of daily figures, with the exception of: Canada (averages of last-Wednesday-of-the-month rates); Japan, Australia, Denmark and Iceland (end-of-month rates); and France and Ireland (last Friday of the month). These rates measure the yield on long-term government bonds on the secondary market with residual maturities of about ten years. The total rate for overall OECD is the average of the mentioned rates, weighted with individual country GDP figures. (Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators)
• Short-term interest rates are averages of daily figures except for: Canada (averages of Wednesday rates); Denmark, Iceland, Ireland and Poland (yearly averages of end-of-month rates). For the Euro area, and individual Euro area countries from 1999 onwards, and from 2001 onwards for Greece, rates are three-month EURIBOR. (Sources: OECD, Main Economic Indicators and European Central Bank)
• Government net debt is defined as total financial liabilities minus all financial assets of general government. Financial assets of the general government sector have a corresponding liability existing outside that sector. The exceptions are monetary gold and Special Drawing Rights, financial assets for which there is no counterpart liability. Monetary gold and Special Drawing Rights may be included as assets of the general government sector, or they may be classified as assets of the central bank, at the discretion of the government. Data refer to the general government sector, which is a consolidation of accounts for the central, state and local governments plus social security. Total outlays are defined as current outlays plus capital outlays. For more details, see OECD Economic Outlook Sources and Methods (www.oecd.org/eco/sources-and-methods). For the US, the data include outlays net of operating surpluses of public enterprises.
• Government gross debt consists of all financial liabilities of general government (typically mainly in the form of government bills and bonds). Source: OECD Economic Outlook 87, June 2010.
